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NOTES
A FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE TO ERIE ANALYSIS
OF STATE LAW CHANGES DURING
DIVERSITY APPEALS
INTRODUCTION
When the law on which a trial court's judgment is based changes
during the appeal of the case, the appellate court must decide whether
to give retroactive or prospective effect to the change in law.' Retro-
1. Making a distinction between two discrete contexts aids an understanding of
the confusing vocabulary of retroactivity. In one, a court must determine the effect
to be given a change in law that originates in another forum. This situation existed in
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 67, 1 Cranch 103, 107 (1801) (treaty
ratification), and presents itself to a federal appellate court in a diversity case
whenever state law changes. See, e.g., Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir.
1981). In this context, the terms "retroactive" and "prospective," as applied to a
change in law, mean simply that either the change in law applies to the facts of the
case or it does not. In the second situation, a court of last resort must determine the
effect to be given a change in law that it has made, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 99 (1971), or is making, Cipriano v. City of Houma. 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969), or that has been made by the Supreme Court on a constitutional issue. Gager
v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 482, 425 N.E.2d 851, 853, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (1981).
Here a court's concern for the precedent it is setting creates the need for a vocabulary
that delimits precisely the class of cases to be covered by the change in law. There are
four classes of cases possibly subject to a change in law: future cases-that is, cases
arising after the change-in-law decision: the case in which the change occurs; cases
pending at the time the change occurs, and cases that have reached final judgment.
Thus, a change in law that is given "complete" or "absolute- retroactive effect would
cover all classes of cases, thereby enabling litigants to attack collaterally the final
judgments rendered in their cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337-39
(1963); cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 & n.13 (1965) (briefly discussing
cases, including Gideon, in which a change in law has been given "absolute" retroac-
tivity); People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 222, 423 N.E.2d 366, 370, 440 N.Y.S.2d
889, 893 (considering "complete" retroactivity but not applying it), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 510 (1981). A change in law given "retroactive" or "retrospective" effect would
cover all cases except those which had reached final judgment. See Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 252 (1969). While a technical distinction has at times been
drawn betveen the terms "retroactive" and "retrospective," e.g., Note, Lien Avoid-
ance Under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code: Is Retrospective Application
Constitutional?, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 615, 620 n.29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lien
Avoidance]; 12 Ottawa L. Rev. 502, 505 (1980), it is generally not observed, and the
two terms are used interchangeably. E.g., Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 352, 353 (4th
Cir. 1980); Lien Avoidance, supra, at 620 n.29. A change in law given "nonretroac-
tive" or "prospective" effect covers the case before the court and future cases. See
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
300-01 (1967). Two reasons have been advanced for giving this kind of effect to a
change in law. One is to avoid the accusation that the change in law would otherwise
be an empty statement of a court's future intent, or mere dictum. Molitor v. Kane-
land Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960). The other is to reward a party for mounting a
successful challenge to the old precedent, see id., and to encourage such challenges in
the future. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390
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activity advances important public policies by providing for their
immediate implementation; 2 prospectivity preserves the rights and
expectations of parties who may have relied on the old precedent. 3
Because these objectives are equally compelling, non-deliberative
rules that implement one to the exclusion of the other are inappro-
priate. A deliberative assessment of the propriety of retroactivity or
prospectivity has thus become the guiding principle of federal retroac-
tivity analyses. 4
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Finally, a change in law that is given "purely prospective" effect
covers only cases arising in the future. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964). A related technique is that of "prospective
overruling" or "sunbursting," see Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S.
358, 364 (1932) (Cardozo, J.), by which a court limits a change in law it is making to
future cases and perhaps to the case before it. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-
Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: "Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting,"
51 Marq. L. Rev. 254, 254 (1968). For discussions of the vocabulary of retroactivity,
see Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L.
Rev. 1557, 1557 n.2 (1975); Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. Legal Stud. 373, 381-84
(1977); Perrello & Colembiewski, Retroactivity of California Supreme Court Deci-
sions: A Procedural Step Toward Fairness, 17 Cal. W. L. Rev. 403, 403-05 (1981).
2. See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) ("ill effect of
prospectivity is the partial frustration of the statutory purpose" that inspired the new
rule). Other virtues of retroactivity that have been advanced are its curbing of
"judicial legislating," Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1372 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (Weis, J., dissenting), and its consonance with the principle, dependent upon a
sense of continuity, that government is one of laws and not of men. People v. Pepper,
53 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 423 N.E.2d 366, 368, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891, cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 510 (1981).
3. E.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1971); United States v.
Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Fitzgerald v.
Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 576-77, 157 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1968).The
role of precedent as a guide to conduct can, of course, be overstated. See Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 409, 419-20 (1928). But see 2 C.
Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.02, at 247 (4th ed.
1973) (referring to "general consensus among all people" that there should be "warn-
ing of the rules that are to be applied to determine their affairs") [hereinafter cited as
Sutherland].
4. The principal federal retroactivity analyses divide between those used in civil
cases, Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717-21 (1974) (for cases on appeal);
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (for cases at trial stage), and
those used in criminal cases. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967); Linklet-
ter v. Walker, 381 U.S 618, 636-38 (1965). In contrast to civil retroactivity analyses,
which emphasize blunting the impact of the change in law on the parties, criminal
retroactivity analyses emphasize blunting the impact of the change in law on effec-
tive law enforcement and the smooth administration of justice. Compare Bradley v.
School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717 (1974) (civil action; concerns for the identity of the
parties, their rights and the change's impact on those rights), and Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1971) (civil action; expressing concern for inequitable
effect of retroactivity on the respondent), with Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967) (criminal case; expressing concern for law enforcement authorities' reliance on
old standards and effect on administration of justice), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 636-38 (1965) (criminal case; emphasis on the rule in question: its prior
history, purpose and effect, and successful integration into administration of the
STATE LAW CHANGES
Currently, however, federal appellate courts in diversity cases con-
sistently apply the non-deliberative rule of retroactivity of Vanden-
bark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.s The Vandenbark rule prescribes
that a federal appellate court apply retroactively any change in state
law that occurs after the entry of judgment in the district court." In
Vandenbark, the principle of deliberativeness squared off with the
principle contained in the landmark case of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins7-that of uniformity of state and federal adjudications of
state created rights." The latter principle prevailed because, accord-
ing to the Court, "[a]ny . . . conclusion [other than retroactive appli-
cation of the state law change] would but perpetuate the confusion
and injustices arising from inconsistent federal and state interpreta-
tions of state law." 9  The Vandenbark rule has been criticized be-
cause, in giving retroactive effect to a change in state law to which a
state might only give prospective effect, it risks the inconsistency it
earnestly sought to prevent.' 0 To avert this potential inconsistency,
Vandenbark's critics have recommended that a court extend its Erie
analysis to the change in state law-that is, determine how a state
would apply the change in its law, and rule accordingly.II
This Note argues that the courts' and critics' preoccupation with
Erie's principle of uniformity draws critical attention away from
Vandenbark's true inconsistency-its failure to implement tradition-
ally deliberative modes of retroactivity analysis. Erie is concerned
with the precedent set when a federal court applies its own rule of
decision in a diversity case. Precedent connotes continuity and indefi-
law). In fact, the dissenters in leading criminal retroactivity cases decry their major-
ity brethren's insensitivity to the effects of their holdings on similarly situated defen-
dants. E.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting). For an interesting consolidation of these distinct concerns in civil and
criminal federal retroactivity analyses, see Lau v. Nelson, 92 Wash. 2d 823, 826-28,
601 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1979) (en banc), reviewed by 55 Wash. L. Rev. 833 (1980).
5. 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) ("[U]ntil such time as a case is no longer sub judice,
the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision
statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court."
(footnote omitted)).
6. See infra pt. I.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. Id. at 78.
9. 311 U.S. at 543.
10. Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F. 2d 376, 381 n.12 (9th Cir. 1974) (Vanden-
bark justly subject to criticism "because it can lead to a difference in the result
obtained in a federal and state court"); [IA pt. 2] J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
0.307[3], at 3104 (2d ed. 1981) ("[C]omplete uniformity cannot emerge from the
hard and fast rule of the Vandenbark case .... ).
11. [IA pt. 2] J. Moore, supra note 10, 1 0.307[3], at 3104-05, cited with
approval in Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376, 381 n.12 (9th Cir. 1974); see
Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 26 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1981); Downs v. J.M. Huber Corp.,
580 F.2d 794, 796 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1978).
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nite duration. A federal appellate court's treatment of a particular
change in state law can never rise to the level of precedent because its
legal life span is measured by the finite time litigants subject to it
remain in the appellate process. Therefore, a change in state law
during a diversity appeal need not be uniformly treated in federal and
state courts. This suspension of the Erie principle opens up alternative
methods by which the federal appellate court can determine the effect
that it should give a change in state law. A court may recommission
an Erie analysis for the purpose of injecting deliberation into the
determination. Alternatively, should Erie analysis be perceived as too
burdensome1 2 to apply when it is not necessary, a federal court may
retool its own "manifest injustice" analysis.' :'
12. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
Wayne L. Rev. 317, 321-26 (1967). Judge Wright describes the practical burdens,
and intimates the psychological ones, of an Erie analysis. Id. at 321-22, 324; see
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 (8th Cir. 1972).
13. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 716-21 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969). The "manifest injustice" analysis was designed to
treat changes in federal law occurring during the appeal of a case. Bradley v. School
Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); see Flanigan v. Burlington N. Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 888-
89 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981). The analysis has been exercised
to the greatest extent in cases involving statutory changes of law. E.g., Eikenberry v.
Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (construing Federal
Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94
Stat. 2369 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331)); Iowa Power & Light Co. v.
Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1981) (construing Staggers Rail
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (to be codified in scattered sections of
45 and 49 U.S.C.)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982); Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v.
ICC, 643 F.2d 542, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1981) (same); Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 352-
53 (4th Cir. 1980) (construing Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Jensen v.
Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 409-13 (5th Cir. 1980) (construing Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, §
2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. 111978)); Sikora v.
American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980) (same). To a lesser extent, the
"manifest injustice" analysis has been used to analyze changes in administrative
regulations, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 225-29 (6th Cir. 1980) (construing Arbitration or Other Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1981)), aff'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (U.S. May 3, 1982);
Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2d
Cir. 1977) (same); Coe v. Secretary of HEW, 502 F.2d 1337, 1339 (4th Cir. 1974)
(construing 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.126-.128 (1980) (redesignation of 20 C.F.R. §§
405.126-.128 (1977)), and changes by judicial decision. E.g., O'Byrne v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 632 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1980) (construing Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980)); Lang v. Texas & P. Ry., 624 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (5th
Cir. 1980) (same); General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147,
1154 (7th Cir. 1978) (construing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977)). The Bradley "manifest injustice" analysis was expressly modeled on
the concerns of United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 69, 1 Cranch 103, 110
(1801). 416 U.S. at 717. The analysis is also used by federal district courts in
determining appeals from administrative fora. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507
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I. THE VANDENBARK RULE-ABANDONINC
DELIBERATION IN RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS
The plaintiff in Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,' 4 a diver-
sity case, sought recovery for occupational diseases she allegedly con-
tracted while employed in defendant's glass factory. At the time, Ohio
provided neither statutory coverage of, nor a common-law cause of
action for, the occupational diseases at issue.' 5 Accordingly, the
district court dismissed the complaint.' 6  During the appeal, an
amendment of the Ohio worker's compensation statute' 7 and an Ohio
Supreme Court decision' 8 each effectively gave the plaintiff the cause
of action she had failed to state in the district court.'9 The Sixth
Circuit refused to apply the intervening changes in Ohio's laws.20
F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). If a change in law occurs
during the district court proceedings, but is not raised until appeal, any benefits from
the change in law may be deemed to have been waived. Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n
v. Grace Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra Coe v.
Secretary of HEW, 502 F.2d 1337, 1339 (4th Cir. 1974).
14. 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
15. Id. at 539. The plaintiff in Vandenbark was initially in limbo. It was Ohio's
settled law that an employer's compliance with the terms of the worker's compensa-
tion statute withdrew from his employees the common-law right to recover for
occupational diseases. The statute, however, enumerated only certain occupational
diseases and did not cover those contracted by plaintiff. Vandenbark v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 110 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1940), rev'd, 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
16. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 110 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1940),
rev'd, 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
17. Act of Apr. 30, 1937, 1937 Ohio Laws 268 (codified as amended at Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4123.68 (Page 1980)).
18. Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundr' Co., 135 Ohio St. 191, 20
N.E.2d 232 (1939).
19. The statutory amendment added silicosis, one of the diseases sued on by
plaintiff, to the schedule of compensable diseases. Act of Apr. 30, 1937, 1937 Ohio
Laws 268, 270 (codified as amended at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.68 (Page 1980)).
The Triff decision held that the common-law cause of action for occupational dis-
eases coexisted with any statutory cause of action. 135 Ohio St. at 205, 20 N.E.2d at
236-37.
20. 110 F.2d at 314. The court noted that changes in statutes are presumed to be
prospective in their effect unless there is contrary legislative intent, which was not
discernible in the Ohio amendment. Id. at 313-14. It further implied that the
statutory change in question, by altering substantive rights rather than mere proce-
dural or remedial rights, required prospective effect. Id. at 314. Focusing on the
judicial change of law, the court also expressed concern that it would upset
"rights... accrued under a particular state of. . . decisions." Id. at 312, see Cor-
bin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762, 769 (1941) ("And were not
Vandenbark's rights and the Glass Company's duties determined by the law as...
made [prior to the overruling decision]?"). Finally, the court said that the Rules of
Decision Act did not require it, an appellate court, to follow the changes in Ohio's
laws. 110 F.2d at 312-13. At the time, the text of the Rules of Decision Act supported
the court's position. Judiciary (Rules of Decision) Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73,
92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)). The Act provided: "The laws of the
several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
1982] 1161
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The Supreme Court reversed. 21 It recognized that the cases de-
cided during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 2 in which it had ignored
intervening changes in states' laws, might not be acceptable prece-
dentS2 3 under the new regime of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.2 4  The
Court did not devise a new, Erie-based rule to handle intervening
state law changes. Rather, the Court adopted the "true rule" regard-
ing retroactivity 25 enunciated in the first "opinion of the Court, "20
United States v. Schooner Peggy.2 7 In Schooner Peggy, a treaty with
France was ratified after the circuit court's decision and before that of
the Court. 28 In giving retroactive effect to the treaty, thereby revers-
ing the circuit court's decree, the Court sternly pronounced the
Schooner Peggy principle: "[I]f, subsequent to the judgment, and
before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and posi-
tively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its
obligation denied. ' 29  Chief Justice Marshall also recognized, how-
ever, that in cases not involving "great national concerns," 30 there is a
shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." Id.
(emphasis added). The emphasized portion of the text was replaced with the words
"civil actions."Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1652, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)). According to the reviser's notes accompanying the House
Report, however, the replacement was intended to bring the Rules of Decision Act's
language into line with that used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. H.R. Rep.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 145 (1947), reprinted in 1 Legislative History
of Title 28, United States Code "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure" § IV (1971); [IA
pt. 2] J. Moore, supra note 10, 0.305[1], at 3042-43.
21. 311 U.S. at 543.
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
23. 311 U.S. at 540-41 & n.9.
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. 311 U.S. at 541.
26. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration, 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 193 & n.41 (1959). Prior practice of the Court
had been to issue seriatim the opinions of the individual justices. Id. at 192.
27. 5 U.S. 64, 68-69, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801).
28. 5 U.S. at 67, 1 Cranch at 107. An article of the treaty, providing for the
mutual restoration of all captured property not yet definitively condemned, directly
conflicted with the circuit court's sentence of condemnation of the schooner, id. at
66, 1 Cranch at 106-07, a French trading vessel captured by American sailors for
carrying a significant cache of ammunition in addition to its merchandise. Id. at 65,
1 Cranch at 105. The ammunition, apparently intended for self-defense, was deemed
by the circuit court to present a hazard to peaceful commerce. Id. at 66, 1 Cranch at
106.
29. Id. at 68, 1 Cranch at 110.
30. Id. at 69, 1 Cranch at 110. In speaking of the treaty, Chief Justice Marshall's
words belied an incipient "political question" deference on the part of the Court to
acts of the executive. "It is certainly true, that the execution of a contract between
nations is to be demanded from, and in the general, superintended by, the executive
1982] STATE LAW CHANGES 1163
compelling need to preserve through prospectivity
, the rights and ex-
pectations of parties who conducted their affairs in reliance on previ-
ously established, but now changed, precedent.3 1  Thus, he signifi-
cantly insulated the harsh principle of retroactivity with a caveat:
-[I]n mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought
to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective
operation, affect the rights of parties ..... 32
The Court in Vandenbark, however, adopted only the Schooner
Peggy principle to obey the law or deny its obligation,3 3 disposing of
the Schooner Peggy caveat to struggle against retroactivity: "It is true
this Court.. .expressed a caution against retrospective operation
between private parties but the [Schooner Peggy] principle quoted has
found acceptance in a variety of situations."34 Here the Court's
disingenuousness was remarkable. The principal cases it claimed sup-
ported the Schooner Peggy principle were cases involving state stat-
utes or local laws.3 5  These cases' support for the Schooner Peggy
of each nation ...." Id. at 68, 1 Cranch at 109. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (discussing foreign relations and the unique demand for a
"single-voiced statement of the Government's views"). In Schooner Peggy, the Chief
Justice also recognized the primacy of the legislative branch's role in the matter: "[Ilf
the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for
the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation." 5 U.S. at
69, 1 Cranch at 110. See generally Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial
Check on the Executive, 42 Va. L. Rev. 175, 197-200 (1956) (discussion of the
executive's treaty power and the Senate's role in checking it). Thus, Schooner Peggy,
along with its contemporary, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
foreshadowed the emergence of the "political question" doctrine. Carrington, supra,
at 176 n.3.
31. 5 U.S. at 69, 1 Cranch at 110; see United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397
U.S. 286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) (Cardozo, J.); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28-29, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97-98 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 968 (1960); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 576-77, 157
N.W.2d 595, 597 (1968). But see Smith, supra note 3, at 419-20. This compelling
need for prospectivity, however, is a matter of judicial policy, not constitutional
mandate. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 701 (1971) (Harlan, I., concur-
ring and dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965); cf. Danforth v.
Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476-77, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes, C. J.)
("prevailing views of justice" inform decisions on retroactivity). But see Ames v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 567 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1977)
(equating one current retroactivity analysis with a "due process inquiry").
32. 5 U.S. at 69, 1 Cranch at 110.
33. 311 U.S. at 541 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 68, 1
Cranch 103, 110 (1801)).
34. Id. at 542.
35. See Corbin, supra note 20, at 775 n.16. In this part of its opinion the
Vandenbark Court cited five principal cases which it claimed supported the Schooner
Peggy principle. 311 U.S. at 542 & nn.12-15. Three of the five cases dealt with
intervening state court decisions construing statutes of limitation. Bauserman v.
Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 658-59 (1893); Moores v. National Bank, 104 U.S. 625, 629
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principle would thus be more accurately described as a fortuitous by-
product of adherence to the Swift v. Tyson 38 principle of deference to
states' written or local laws. 37 By excising the Schooner Peggy caveat,
the Vandenbark Court disposed of the deliberative dimension to its
retroactivity analysis. Without insulation, the Schooner Peggy princi-
ple became a universal, inflexible rule of retroactivity.
II. THE: ERIE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY-ITS
INAPPLICABILITY TO CHANGES IN STATE LAW
DURING DIvERSITY APPEALS
The Vandenbark Court sacrificed the Schooner Peggy caveat to
struggle against retroactivity because it perceived a sterner mandate
in Erie's principle of uniformity.38 This sacrifice of deliberativeness
in the name of Erie has been reenacted in the many cases following
the Vandenbark rule of automatic retroactivity.39  Changes in states'
(1881); Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U.S. 674, 677-79 (1876). As these and other cases demon-
strate, the Court for many years had been treating state court constructions of
statutes of limitation as falling directly within the embrace of the Rules of Decision
Act. Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1862); see Bauserman v.
Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 652 (1893). Moreover, the statute of limitations at issue in Kibbe
governed the action in that case for the recovery of real property, an item Justice
Story specifically included in his delimitation of the scope of the Rules of Decision
Act. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12-13, 16 Pet. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); cf. Green v. Neal, 31 U.S. 188, 192-93, 6 Pet. 291,
296-97 (1832) (Court dutifully following Tennessee's fitful constructions of adverse
possession statute of limitations). The other two cases cited by the Court were
unexceptional decisions in which the Court had deferred to a state's highest court's
construction of a statute, Sioux County v. National Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238, 240
(1928), and of the res judicata effect of some of the state court's prior holdings.
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1939). Most
significantly, none of the cases cited by the Court makes any reference to Schooner
Peggy or its principle of retroactivity. Considered in conjunction with the exceptional
cases noted by the Court earlier in its opinion, 311 U.S. at 541 & n.9, these cases only
remotely support the Schooner Peggy principle of retroactivity. They could more
accurately be described as examples of the Court's equivocal treatment of state court
constructions of state statutes and constitutions during the age of Swift v. Tyson,
1842-1938.
36. 41 U.S. 1, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Swift required the federal courts to conform their decisions only to state court
constructions of "positive statutes," and other inherently local matters, such as rights
and titles to real property. Id. at 12-13, 16 Pet. at 18-19. As for matters of "general
commercial law," the federal courts were as competent, both in the judicial and non-
judicial sense, to determine what the law was or should be. Id.
37. But see Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907, 915 (1962) (Court's observation of support in cited
cases for Schooner Peggy principle deemed correct) [hereinafter cited as Prospective
Overruling].
38. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941).
39. But see Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 875 (8th
Cir. 1966) (Vandenbark yields to the Schooner Peggy caveat regarding private party
status of litigants).
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laws introducing new causes of action,40 displacing old causes of
action, 4' abrogating tort defenses42 or standards of care,4 3 and modify-
ing jury instructions 44 have been given retroactive effect. Circuit
courts and Professor Moore have argued that the Erie policy of uni-
formity, however, requires a federal appellate court in diversity cases
to determine whether the state would apply the change in law retro-
actively or prospectively and to rule accordingly. 45  Preoccupation
with Erie has distracted attention from the necessary appraisal of
whether this policy of uniformity is in fact relevant to changes in state
law occurring during diversity appeals. 46
A. The Erie Principle of Uniformity
In Erie, Justice Brandeis succinctly stated the principle of unifor-
mity of state and federal adjudications of state-created rights: "'Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the
State."' 47  Commentators have debated whether this uniformity is
constitutionally compelled. 48  Certain Justices have cited Erie as a
constitutionally compelled decision. 49 Yet they have avoided pinning
40. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1972)
(strict liability).
41. Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 744 (2d Cir. 1981) (loss of consortium in
wrongful death actions); Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1981) (same).
42. Downs v. J.M. Huber Corp., 580 F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1978) ("no duty"
rule in tort actions against land owners); Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376,
381 (9th Cir. 1974) (assumption of risk doctrine).
43. Samuels v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1979) ("local-
ity rule" in medical malpractice suits).
44. Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1979) (in
products liability case, charge to jury that liability depends on product's being
"unreasonably dangerous" is improper).
45. See Downs v. J.M. Huber Corp., 580 F.2d 794, 796 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1978);
Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376, 381 n.12 (9th Cir. 1974); [lA pt. 2] J.
Moore, supra note 10, 0.307[3], at 3105; cf. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 875 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Eric without attempting to
rebut Vandenbark).
46. One commentator criticized Vandenbark as a "shocking illustration of the
extent to which the Court has carried the rule of the Erie case." Broh-Kahn,
Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 Ky. L.J. 99, 107 (1943). Broh-
Kahn, the attorney for the respondent in Vandenbark, makes a compelling equal
protection argument in his article. Unlike state court litigants who can argue the
validity of the overruling decision before the court that delivered it, federal diversity
litigants, under the Vandenbark rule, have no such opportunity, and are subject to
the change in state law without recourse. Id. at 108-09.
47. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
48. For a discussion of the constitutional bases of Erie and identification of the
members of the opposing camps on the issue, see C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of
Federal Courts § 56, at 260-61 & nn.15-16 (3d ed. 1976).
49. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 303 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Lee v.
Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 n.3 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Erie to a specific provision of the Constitution, such as the tenth
amendment.5 0 This avoidance indicates that the Court considers the
Erie principle of uniformity as executing the policies of federalism
generally reflected in the Constitution's allocation of law-creating
functions between state and federal authority. 5' This avoidance has
also necessitated designing and deploying tests to achieve the desired
uniformity.
B. The Appropriate Test of Erie Uniformity
Three tests of Erie's uniformity principle have evolved since the case
was decided: the "outcome determinative" test, formulated in 1945 in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York; 52 the "balancing" test, formulated thir-
teen years later in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc.; 53 and in 1965, the "modified outcome determinative test" of
Hanna v. Plumer,-' the last such test designed by the Court.55 It is
50. U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."). Justice Brandeis referred to the "unconstitutionality of the
course pursued" under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). Later in the opinion, Justice Brandeis attempted to clarify his
earlier statement, only to introduce the possible tenth amendment presence in the
Court's holding: "In disapproving that doctrine [of Swift] we do not hold unconstitu-
tional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 .... We merely declare that in
applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which...
are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." Id. at 79-80. Two commenta-
tors have considered whether Erie is based on the fifth amendment. Leathers, Erie
and Its Progeny As Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 791, 795-96 (1974)
(identifying fifth amendment's equal protection component in Erie); McCoid, Hanna
v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 Va. L. Rev. 884, 889-90 (1965)
(rejecting due process presence in Erie).
51. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(referring to Erie as "one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism"); Hill, The
Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 427-28 (1958).
52. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Guaranty, the Court faced a choice between applying
the state statute of limitations, which most likely would bar the action, and the
equitable doctrine of laches, which might not. Id. at 101; C. Wright, supra note 48,
§ 55, at 256. Under this test, a state rule had to be applied instead of a competing
federal rule if it would lead to a substantially different outcome in the case.
53. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). The plaintiff in Byrd was injured in his work as it
lineman for a construction contractor hired by defendant to lay and connect power
lines. Id. at 526-27. One of the defendant's affirmative defenses was that, under the
applicable worker's compensation statute, plaintiff was effectively its statutory em-
ployee whose exclusive remedy was under the statute. Id. at 527. A relevant state
court decision, Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957),
had indicated that the issue of a worker's status as a statutory employee was to be
determined as a matter of law by the trial court judge, not the jury. Id. at 543, 96
S.E.2d at 571. Adams was handed down pending Byrd's appeal to the Court, 356
U.S. at 534 n.6, but there was no discussion of the constraint imposed by Vanden-
bark to follow intervening state court decisions.
54. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, a personal injury action, plaintiff had served
the executor of defendant's estate by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint
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generally agreed that the York test overemphasized uniformity of
outcome56 and did not survive the qualifications given it in Byrd57 and
Hanna.5 8 The Court in Hanna said "[t]he 'outcome determination' test
[of York] . . . cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of
the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws. ' 5 9  This qualification of the
York test signifies that strict uniformity of outcome is not an end in
itself, but the means to achieve important policies.
It is not entirely clear, however, whether the Byrd test, a complex
balancing of the state and federal interests implicated in the choice-of-
law decision, has survived Hanna.6 0  Several commentators in the
wake of Byrd doubted the breadth of its precedent,6 1 reasoning that
the Court's protection of the right to trial by jury in that case was
compelled by the seventh amendment,6 2 despite the Court's "delicate
reference to the Constitution.1 63  In a case decided shortly after
with the executor's wife at his personal residence. Id. at 461. This service was proper
according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), but improper according to the
Massachusetts rule, still in effect, which dictated personal service upon an executor or
administrator. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 197, § 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981).
55. A fourth test of Erie's principle of uniformity was devised by Justice Harlan
in his concurring opinion in Hanna. Under this test, a federal rule would be applica-
ble only if the alternative state rule was not one that governed individuals' planning
of primary private conduct. 380 U.S. at 474-75 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 505 (1954).
56. See H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 678
(1953) ("no stopping place" to goal of uniformity); Clark, Book Review, 36 Cornell
L.Q. 181, 183 (1950) (Judge Clark referring to "drastic logic" in pursuing goal of
uniformity of outcome).
57. 356 U.S. at 537-38; see Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406 (5th
Cir. 1960) ("Whatever else [Byrd] is thought to do, it certainly amplifies.., that all
does not necessarily fall in the path of uniformity of result." (footnote omitted)).
58. 380 U.S. at 468; M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation
of Judicial Power 173 (1980); see C. Wright, supra note 48, § 55, at 257-58.
59. 380 U.S. at 468 (footnote omitted). Forum shopping was not intrinsically
mischievous; it only became so when the forum shopper maneuvered the litigation
into the federal court and achieved the favorable result he knew he could not have
achieved in the state's courts. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 693, 710 (1974); McCoid, supra note 50, at 889.
60. Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 886 n.8 (Ist Cir. 1981).
61. Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diver-
sity Litigation, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 451 (1962); 43 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 581-82
(1959); see Ely, supra note 59, at 709; Comment, Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded
Concept of Federal Common Law-A Requiem for Erie?, 1966 Duke L.J. 142, 158-
59 & nn.73-74; Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act
and the Erie Doctrine, 85 Yale L.J. 678, 691 n.66 (1976).
62. U.S. Const. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law . .. the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
63. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 403 n.95 (1964); see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 537 & n.10 (1958).
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Byrd,64 the Court confirmed the suspicions of these early Byrd com-
mentators by stating that the decision was based on the seventh
amendment. 65 Byrd is rarely cited for any proposition other than that
a state rule must yield to the federal court's interest in protecting the
individual's right to trial by jury.""
The Byrd test has never been refined by the Court. 7  Its fate is
perhaps best determined by comparing it to the Hanna test. Both tests
strive to maintain an equilibrium between the federal interest in
having federal law applied and a state interest in having its law
applied.6 1 The Byrd test, however, is far more complicated. Carried
to its logical conclusion, it involves a balancing of the answers to three
inquiries: whether the state rule is "bound up" in the rights and
obligations underlying the controversy; whether the result of applying
the federal rule would substantially differ from the result of applying
the state rule; whether the federal rule evinces some federal inter-
est.69 This third inquiry encompasses a range of intensity of federal
interests that depends on the answers to the first two inquiries. Nega-
tive answers to the first two inquiries all but eliminate the need to
identify a federal interest. The federal interest in applying a conven-
ient or economical rule7 0 would suffice. Affirmative answers to the
first two inquiries necessitate that an especially intense federal interest
be found in the third inquiry in order for a federal rule to be ap-
plied. 71 If the answers to the first two inquiries are mixed-for
64. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355
(1962).
65. Id. at 360.
66. Almost all Supreme Court cites to Byrd concern the right to a jury trial.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 352 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649-50 (1977) (per curiam); Simler v.
Connor, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962); Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines,
Inc., 360 U.S. 273, 278 (1959). Byrd was also cited for its evidentiary issue, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 156 (1963), and the federal
courts' power to issue habeas corpus writs. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963).
67. M. Redish, supra note 58, at 175 & n.48.
68. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
69. 356 U.S. at 535-40. For a discussion of other renditions of the "Byrd test," see
M. Redish, supra note 58, at 175-77.
70. See M. Redish, supra note 58, at 195-96. Professor Redish identifies a federal
"cost avoidance" interest that can, "[c]onsonant with the policies underlying Erie
and the Rules of Decision Act," justify a departure from a state rule containing a
significant state interest. Id. at 195.
71. Cf. 356 U.S. at 537 (Court identifying "affirmative countervailing" federal
interest in distribution of "trial functions between judge and jury"). In Byrd, the
Court answered negatively the first inquiry of its test. Id. at 536. Thus, it is not
certain whether the "affirmative countervailing" interest it isolated would still tip the
balance in favor of applying the federal rule had the first inquiry of the test been
answered positively-that is, had the Court determined that the state rule was
"bound up" in the underlying rights and obligations of the parties. See generally M.
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example, the state rule is not "bound up" but a substantially different
result is probable if it is not applied-then the intensity of the federal
interest in applying its own rule is reduced to some undefined, inter-
mediate range.72
The Hanna test is a simpler analytical construct 73 keyed to the
"twin aims" of Erie: the "discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 74 Using this
construct, a court determines not just whether one of the litigants was
a forum shopper, but also whether its choice of federal law will set a
precedent that promotes forum shopping in future cases presenting the
same issue of law, thereby facilitating the inequitable administration
of the laws. 75 In addition to being simpler to apply, the Hanna test
also achieves the aims of the Byrd test. A Hanna test would not allow
a policy-laden state rule, "bound up" in the underlying rights and
obligations of the parties, to be superseded by a competing federal
rule. A federal alternative to this kind of state rule would be perceived
by a court using the Hanna test as more likely to promote forum
shopping than a federal alternative to a state rule not entangled in
underlying rights and obligations. Nor would the Hanna test allow the
application of a federal rule if the substantially different results it
might produce would prompt prospective litigants to choose the fed-
eral forum over the state forum. 7  The Hanna analysis, therefore,
would allow the application of a federal rule only if it would not lead
to forum shopping or the correlative inequitable administration of
law, or in Byrd terms, only if the answers to the first two Byrd
inquiries were negative, or in some circumstances, mixed. 7Thus, the
Redish, supra note 58, at 175 (hypothesizing, but not resolving under the Byrd test,
situation where significant state interest clashes with significant federal interest); id.
at 201 (resolving situation with form of author's proposed "refined balancing test").
72. See supra note 71. Partly because the Court has never refined the complex
Byrd balancing test, lower federal courts have fashioned their own Rules of Decision
Act tests by cannibalizing parts of the Byrd and Hanna tests. See M. Redish, supra
note 58, at 178-80. The Byrd test is vulnerable to criticism not only on the grounds of
its complexity, but also on the grounds of its subjectivity. See C. Wright, su pra note
48, at 275.
73. M. Redish, supra note 58, at 172, 187, 189.
74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
75. Id. at 468-69 & nn.9 & 11. The language concluding footnote 9 in the Hanna
opinion demonstrates that the Court looks beyond the litigants before it, and ques-
tions how its choice of federal law would affect prospective plaintiffs: "[The question
under Erie is] whether application of the [state] rule would have so important an
effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court." One commentator has
suggested that the Court effectively disposed of the Byrd balancing test in footnote 9.
M. Redish, supra note 58, at 178.
76. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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advantage of the Hanna analysis is that it does not necessitate the
cumbersome identification and weighing of state and federal interests
that Byrd requires. Hanna's comparative simplicity partially explains
why the Court has given so little currency to the Byrd test. 78
A final indication that Hanna has supplanted the Byrd test came in
1980 when the Court reaffirmed the Hanna test in Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp.79 Because Walker was indistinguishable 80 from Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,8' the Court simply decided it
on the basis of stare decisis. The Court confirmed its holding, how-
ever, by examining the result the Hanna test would have produced if
applied.82 Apparently, the Court was unimpressed with criticism 8 3 of
its preoccupation with Hanna's "twin aims" test. Thus, the Court's
treatment of Byrd and Hanna, and the fact that the Hanna test amply
and more easily satisfies the concerns of the Byrd test, suggest that the
Byrd test has not survived Hanna,84 at least in cases not presenting
Byrd's narrow issue of the federal interest in submitting disputed
issues of fact to a jury.8
C. Inapplicability of the Erie Uniformity
Principle to State Law Changes
When a federal appellate court in diversity cases uses a retroactivity
analysis different from that used by a state, it risks treating the change
in state law differently from the way the state would treat it. Whether
inconsistent treatment of changes in state law is tolerable under Erie
must be judged from two perspectives: that of the litigant who gains
by the inconsistent treatment of the change in law, and that of the
potential litigant observing this gain.
It is unlikely that a litigant could make a conscious decision to take
advantage of an appellate retroactivity analysis. Such a decision
would have to have been made at the commencement of the suit and
been based on the calculation that the law would change during the
pendency of a potential appeal in the case. The forum shopper Erie
sought to discourage, however, was not a seer. Instead, he relied on
78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
79. 446 U.S. 740 (1980); accord Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & Gynecolog-
ical Assocs., 505 F. Supp. 129, 130 (D.N.J. 1981).
80. 446 U.S. at 748.
81. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
82. 446 U.S. at 753.
83. M. Redish, supra note 58, at 172; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Hart, supra note 55, at 512-13.
84. M. Redish, supra note 58, at 175 n.48; Ely, supra note 59, at 717 n.130.
Contra 44 Tex. L. Rev. 560, 562-63 & n.20 (1966).
85. Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., 505 F. Supp.
129, 131-32 (D.N.J. 1981); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 225 (D.R.I.
1978).
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the law as it existed at the commencement of the suit and maneuvered
the litigation into the federal forum because it was likely to use its own
judgment in resolving the issues in controversy.8"
Erie's concern for the inequitable administration of the law is not
implicated in appellate retroactivity analyses. Inequitable administra-
tion of the law connotes a continuity or pattern of different results
that makes the federal courts more attractive to the forum shopper. 81
Consistent use of different retroactivity analyses would induce forum
shopping only if the different results reached were attributable to the
different analyses being used. The results of a deliberative retroactiv-
ity analysis, however, are heavily dependent upon the nature of the
change and the identity of the parties; therefore, no reliable pattern
emerges to guide the forum shopper.88  Nor does a retroactivity analy-
sis offer any greater promise of an advantage to the potential litigant
than to one already in the judicial process: The potential litigant is
subject to the law as changed. 89
III. DELIBERATIVE OIrONS TO THE VANDENBARK RULE
Because appellate retroactivity analyses, including the Vandenbark
rule, do not risk the kind of inconsistent adjudications that worr,
Erie,90 Erie analysis need not be applied. This is not to say that Erie
86. See Ely, supra note 59, at 717 & n. 130; McCoid, supra note 50, at 889.
87. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1945); Vandenbark v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 74-78 (1938); 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 903 (1953); Hart, supra note 55, at 505.
88. In contrast, state rules on some issues are consistently applied by federal
courts to discourage forum shopping. One example is state rules that require the
arbitration of medical malpractice claims before judicial action can be taken on
them. E.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1969);
Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., 505 F. Supp. 129, 130-32
(D.N.J. 1981); Sander v. Providence Hosp., 483 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
Another example is state door closing statutes, see Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir. 1981) (dictum), which require a foreign corpora-
tion to register with a state before it can sue in the state's courts. E.g., Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Baron & Co. v. Bank of N.J., 504 F.
Supp. 1199, 1208-09 (D.N.J. 1981).
89. Under justice Harlan's test of the Erie principle of uniformity, see supra note
55, an appellate retroactivity analysis is not one that confounds individuals' attempts
to plan their "primary private activity." It could be argued that an individual, in
conforming his conduct to a state standard, assumes that the effect given to a change
in that state standard will be determined by the state's retroactivity analysis. This
assumption, however, would only remotely guide one in his planning of primary
private conduct.
90. See Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 248, 264-
71 (1963). In the latter part of his article, Professor Vestal reviews those eases
following Byrd that have attempted to identify countervailing federal considerations
that justify a departure from Erie uniformity. He concludes that these cases do not
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analysis has no utility in this context. It does remedy Vandenbark's
reflexive and non-deliberative approach to the retroactivity ques-
tion.9' A court's desire to effect this remedy, however, may not be
strong enough to overcome its contentment with Vandenbark's easy
rule of automatic retroactivity. In this situation, where the federal
court's mind is willing, but flesh weak, "manifest injustice" analysis
may prove to be a valuable alternative. It would be less onerous than
Erie analysis in that it allows the federal court to determine on its own
what effect to give to an intervening change in state law.
A. Erie Retroactivity Analysis
Erie referred to the application of state law "declared by its Legisla-
ture in a statute or by its highest court.192 Thus, if a state's legislature
or its highest court had decided whether the change in law should be
given retroactive or prospective effect, that decision would become
the basis of the federal court's decision and Erie analysis would
end. 93 Absent this definitive word, a court would proceed to a review
of any intermediate or trial court treatment of the change's retroactiv-
ity or prospectivity.9 4  If lower state courts had not addressed the
represent a "repudiation of Erie, but simply a recognition that the policy of that case
is inappropriate in certain situations." Id. at 271. But see Comment, State or Federal
Law in Federal Courts: The Rise and Fall of Erie, 42 Miss. L.J. 89, 99 (1971)
(concluding that Byrd and Hanna are not instructive unless federal interest is tied to a
federal rule or the Constitution).
91. See Downs v. J.M. Huber Corp., 580 F.2d 794, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1978). The
Downs court linked the Vandenbark rule with an Erie analysis of a change in Texas
law that abolished the "no duty" defense in tort actions against landowners. Id. at
795, 796-97. The court deliberatively assessed prior Texas case law, concluding that
it gave ample warning that the "no duty" defense was about to be abandoned. Id. at
797.
92. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
93. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
94. See West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940). The
analysis at this juncture has undergone considerable refinement since the Court first
decided that the federal court in diversity cases was bound to follow lower state court
decisions, even those of a state's trial court. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311
U.S. 169, 178-79 (1940); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, supra note 56, at 628. Field laid
down the general principle that "in the absence of more convincing evidence of what
the state law is, [the decision of an intermediate state court] should be followed by a
federal court in deciding a state question." 311 U.S. at 178; accord Stoner v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223, 236-38 (1940); Six Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist., 311 U.S. 180, 188
(1940). These "311 U.S." cases have been subject to censure. Judge Friendly referred
to them as "excesses" and "outrages." Friendly, supra note 63, at 400, 401. The Field
decision has been hardest hit. See 2 W. Crosskey, supra note 87, at 922-29; Broh-
Kahn, supra note 46, at 106-07; Corbin, supra note 20, at 766-70, 775. See generally
Hart, supra note 55, at 510 & n.68 ("second rate justice" administered by federal
court if it is bound to follow intermediate state court decisions); Vestal, supra note
90, at 256 (noting trend in federal courts to use discretion in following lower state
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issue, the federal court would further inquire whether the state had
adopted a blanket rule of retroactivity or prospectivity. 15 Absent a
general rule, the federal court would finally resort to prior state court
treatments of changes in law to ascertain what retroactivity analysis,
if any, the state has applied.9 6 If it finds such an analysis, the federal
court must then apply it exactly as the state's highest court would.
9 7
The chances of Erie retroactivity analysis being adopted are slight.
Uniformity between state and federal adjudications need not control
how an intervening change in state law is applied.98 A court may
nevertheless view Erie analysis as a way to impart deliberation to the
retroactivity issue. The vicarious aspects of Erie's fact determination
process and the burdens they entail, °9 however, would dampen any
inclination to apply the analysis for its deliberative value.
court decisions). A federal court will project the deference that a state's highest court
would accord to the rulings of its lower courts, and act accordingly. Vestal, supra
note 90, at 256; see Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir.
1945), questioned in Polk County v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 489
(5th Cir. 1959).
95. See Downs v. J.M. Huber Corp., 580 F.2d 794, 796 n.3, 796-97 (5th Cir.
1978); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 875 (8th Cir.
1966). New York's consistency in giving retroactive effect to all kinds of law changes,
see Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 27 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1981), closely approximates a
blanket rule. This consistency of result, however, masks the inconsistent use of
retroactivity analyses by New York's Court of Appeals. See Gurnee v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 184, 192-94, 433 N.E.2d 128, 130-31, 448 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147-48
(1982) (application of federal retroactivity analysis of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)); People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 222, 423 N.E.2d 366, 370,
440 N.Y.S.2d 889, 893 (recognizing a "manifest injustice" exception to retroactivity),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 510 (1981). This inconsistency makes a federal court's Erie
analysis more difficult.
96. See Lowe's N. Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319
F.2d 469, 472-73 (4th Cir. 1963); Leport v. White River Barge Line, 315 F.2d 129,
130 (3d Cir. 1963); Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity
Case, 40 Ind. L.J. 541, 553 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ascertainment of State Law].
97. See [1A pt. 2] J. Moore, supra note 10, 0.309[2], at 3119-20 (describing
analogical method of state law ascertainment); Ascertainment of State Law, supra
note 96, at 550-51, 553-54 (discussion of federal courts' application of state law after
adopting the judicial attitude and approach of the state court).
98. See supra pt. II(B), (C).
99. Wright, supra note 12, at 321-22; cf. [LA pt. 21 J. Moore, supra note 10,
0.309[2], at 3129 (concluding list of some 15 sources that courts should check with
remark that "[h]aving considered all of these things, the federal judge will then
decide the case"). Judge Wright recognized that "dangerously low morale" could
result were he required to embark on an Erie analysis of any complex state issue.
Wright, supra note 12, at 324. Another circuit judge has taken a more sanguine view
of the Erie burden of ascertaining state law. See Magruder, The Trials and Tribula-
tions of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 Cornell L.Q. 1, 6 (1958). The escape
from these burdens through abstention, whereby the court waits for the state's
highest court to treat the issue in question, was shut off by an early post-Erie case,
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234, 237-38 (1943); see Cooper v.
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B. "Manifest Injustice" Analysis
If only lower state courts had spoken on the issue of the retroactivity
or prospectivity of a particular change in state law, the burdens of
Erie analysis would begin to become pronounced. These burdens
could be avoided and due deliberation, side-stepped in Vandenbark,
could be given to the retroactivity question, if the federal court were
to use its familiar "manifest injustice" analysis of intervening changes
in federal law. 00
This analysis was formulated in Bradley v. School Board,'10 a school
desegregation suit in which the lone issue before the Court was an
award of attorney's fees.10 2 While the case was pending appeal to the
Fourth Circuit, Congress for the first time authorized awards of
reasonable attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in school desegrega-
tion suits. 0 3  The Court analogized this intervening congressional
amendment to the intervening treaty in Schooner Peggy. 04 It ex-
pressly modeled its manifest injustice analysis on both the principle of
Schooner Peggy and its admonition to struggle against retroactiv-
ity. 0 5 Manifest injustice analysis begins with a presumption that
retroactive effect should be given to any change in federal law that
American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945); Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267,
293 (1946).
100. "Manifest injustice" is the federal retroactivity analysis applied in civil ap-
peals. See supra note 4.
101. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
102. Id. at 698-99. Without any statutory authority to guide it, the district court
invoked its general equity power to award attorney's fees to plaintiff-petitioners.
Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 33-34, 42-44 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd en bane,
472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). The two
previous appeals in the litigation, begun in 1961, concerned the validity of proposed
"plans" to effect the desegregation of the Richmond, Virginia public schools. School
Board v. Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973) (per curiam), af-'g by an
equally divided Court 462 F.2d 1058, 1069 (4th Cir. 1972) (district judge lacked the
power to order consolidation of neighboring districts under one plan); Bradley v.
School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 103-05 (1965) (per curiam) (remanding case for determina-
tion of whether racially based method of assigning teachers rendered desegregation
plans inadequate).
103. Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. VII, § 718, 86
Stat. 354, 369 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)). The Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's award, finding that the congressional amendment was inapplicable
and that the district court exceeded its authority in granting the fees. 472 F.2d at 330,
331-32. On the same lay as the Bradley decision, the Fourth Circuit in Thompson v.
School Bd., 472 F.2d .177 (4th Cir. 1973) (en bane and per curiam), limited the effect
of the statutory authorization for attorney's fees to services rendered after its effective
date. Id. at 178; accord Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 480 F.2d
583, 585 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). This was a typical response to the question of
the retroactivity of attorney's fees legislation. See Matthews v. Walter, 512 F.2d 941,
946 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
104. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 67, 1 Cranch 103, 107 (1801).
105. 416 U.S. at 711-16.
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occurs while a case is pending appeal.' 0 6 The presumption can be
rebutted, however, by legislative history or express direction that the
statute be applied prospectively. 07 Courts generally require that the
106. Id. at 711. For many years. presumptions in retroactivity analyses depended
on the source of the change in law. Changes by judicial decision were considered
properly retroactive according to the Blackstonian theory that judges do not make
law, but only declare what the law has always been. I W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*69-70. According to this view, a judicial decision discarding old precedent and
establishing a new one represented not a change in law, but a change in perception of
the law. The law "was conceived of as having always been there, waiting just to be
correctly stated." People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262, 268, 333 N.E.2d 339, 343, 372
N.Y.S.2d 25, 30 (1975); accord Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12, 16 Pet. 1, 18 (1842),
overruled, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Freeman, The Protection
Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 Colum. L.
Rev. 230, 232-33 (1918). This conception of the law as an eternal principle is classical
in origin, see Fairchild, supra note 1, at 254, and perhaps even traceable to the
Platonic allegory of the cave. Plato, The Republic bk. VII, at 208 (B. Jowett trans.
Dolphin bks. ed. 1960); see Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358,
365 (1932). Justice Holmes rejected this conception of a transcendent law when he
wrote that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Statutory
changes were considered properly prospective, Greene v. United States, 376 U.S.
149, 160 (1964) (citing Union P.R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199
(1913)); 2 Sutherland, supra note 3, § 41.04, at 252; see United States v. Heth, 7 U.S.
239, 248, 3 Cranch 399, 413 (1806); County Bd. of Supervisors v. Breese, 171 Neb.
37, 42-43, 105 N.W.2d 478, 482 (1960); Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14, 76 A.2d 877, 878
(1950) (per curiam), on the theory that a legislative body -should not *adjudicate' the
rights of known individuals." Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d
1077, 1080 (1st Cir. 1977). The judicial theory of retroactivity had undergone
considerable erosion by the time of the Bradley decision, Stason, Choice of Law
Within the Federal System: Erie versus Hanna, 52 Cornell L.Q. 377, 385 n.27
(1967); Prospective Overruling, supra note 37, at 911; cf. Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) ("[A]ll-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." (footnote omitted));
Schettler v. County of Santa Clara, 74 Cal. App. 3d 990, 997, 141 Cal. Rptr. 731,
735 (1978) (rule of retroactivity of judicial decisions subject to considerations of
"fairness and public policy"); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571,
575-76, 157 N.W.2d 595, 596-97 (1968) (listing recognized exceptions to Blackstonian
theory of retroactivity), due to the recognition that judges do make law. E.g.,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 2 J.
Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence § 919 (R. Campbell ed. n.d.); Corbin, supra note
20, at 773. The theory regarding the prospectivity of statutory changes gave way to
the recognition that some statutory changes are best given retroactive effect, espe-
cially when they are ameliorative in nature. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-
23, 432 A.2d 80, 84-85 (1981). For a discussion of the erosion of the rule that
statutory changes should act only prospectively, see Sikora v. American Can Co., 622
F.2d 1116, 1125-29 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., dissenting).
107. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); see Sikora v. American Can
Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1127 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., dissenting) (-[T]he Court
appears to have abandoned the presumption of prospectivity, adopted instead a rule
of presumed retroactivity, and incorporated the prospectivity presumption into a
19821 1175
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indication of prospectivity be clearly stated. 108 As in Bradley, these
legislative sources rarely meet the requirement, 10 9 and courts consis-
tently proceed to consider whether retroactivity would be manifestly
unjust to one of the parties.110
The Bradley Court synthesized leading prior cases on retroactivity
to arrive at three independent' "manifest injustice" factors: the
'manifest injustice' exception to the new rule."). Despite Bradley's presumption that
statutory changes should be retroactive, some courts still adhere to the old rule
presuming that statutory changes are prospective only. E.g., Swinton v. J. Frank
Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976);
In re Reilly, 442 F.2d 26, 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). Other
courts perceive "manifest injustice" as competing with the old presumption against
retroactivity. E.g., Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796,
805 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982). Some courts read
Bradley as establishing a presumption of prospectivity. See Hospital Employees
Labor Program v. Ridgeway Hosp., 570 F.2d 167, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1978); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 411 (2d Cir. 1975).
108. Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1129 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J.,
dissenting); see Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(per
curiam). A court at this branch of the analysis may make allowance for less than
express legislative command. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-23, 432 A.2d 80,
84-85 (1981). Prior and contemporaneous amendments of the same statute are some-
times reviewed, with differing results. Compare Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp.,
628 F.2d 85, 92-93 (D.C. Cir.) (absence of provision barring retroactivity, where
prior amendments included such provisions, is tantamount to direction for retroac-
tivity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980), with Brown v. General Servs, Admin., 507
F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974) (concurrently amended section of statute directing
retroactivity does not mean that sections without such direction are to be applied
prospectively), aff'd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). Effective dates of an amendment are not
deemed dispositive of the issue of the legislative intent on the retroactivity issue.
Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1980). If retroactiv-
ity is expressly called for, further analysis is unnecessary, see Weisenberger v.
Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979); Monroe v.
County Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 263, 264-65 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), although
the court may discuss the three "manifest injustice" factors to bolster its finding of
retroactivity. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Bunch v. United States, 548 F.2d 336, 338-
39 (9th Cir. 1977).
109. 416 U.S. at 715-16, 716 n.22.
110. E.g., id. at 711; Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 410-11
(5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d
619, 622 (5th Cir. 1977); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549
F.2d 822, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Prior to Bradley's formulation of the "manifest
injustice" factors, a court might look to implicit indicia of legislative intent. See Do
Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
949 (1972).
111. See 416 U.S. at 718-21; Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406,
411 (5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.
1980); cf. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969) (only if purpose of new
rule is not served by retroaction are other factors called into play); Holzsager v.
Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1981) (failure of proof in one prong of
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nature and identity of the parties, the nature of their rights, and the
nature of the impact of the change in law on those rights.' 2  -'Mani-
fest injustice" analysis, as described in Bradley, requires the applica-
tion of all three factors. Courts typically, however, focus on one of the
three factors in making determinations, and use the other two factors
merely to confirm the result reached. The predominant factor will be
the one that is based on that case, among the leading retroactivity
cases Bradley synthesized," 3 the facts of which most closely resemble
those of the case before the court. The first factor, the nature and
identity of the parties, is most relevant when one of the parties is a
governmental or public entity." 4 The issues contested in such a case
are likely to be of "great national concern,""15 and retroactivity is
considered the most effective implementation of policies underlying
the change in law.1 6  The second factor, the nature of the rights of
Chevron analysis is fatal to rebuttal of presumption of retroactivity): Valencia v.
Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1980) (all three Chevron
factors must support prospective application of change in law), revd on other
grounds, 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
112. 416 U.S. at 716-17.
113. See id. at 717. The major retroactivity cases the Bradley Court focused on
were Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), Greene v. United States, 376
U.S. 149 (1964), and United States v. Schooner Peggy., 5 U.S. 64, 1 Cranch 103
(1801).
114. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 718 (1974); United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 69, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801). A significant number of
cases applying "manifest injustice" analysis have involved some governmental entity.
E.g., Lawrence v. Staats, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1225 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 11, 1981) (per curiam) (General Accounting Office); Eikenberry v. Callahan,
653 F.2d 632, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (former FBI official); Iowa Power
& Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1981) (Interstate
Commerce Commission), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
115. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 719 (1974) (citing United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 69, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801)).
116. See Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796, 805 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982). Aside from the school desegregation
issue in Bradley, other "great national concerns" calling for retroactive application
have been environmental control, cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228,
1233-34 (6th Cir. 1978) (retroactive application of Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-217, § 309(a)(5)(B), 91 Stat. 1566, 1593 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(B)
(1976 & Supp. II 1978))), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979), effective commerce, cf.
Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796, 805 (8th Cir. 1981)
(healthy railroad system a national concern), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982),
the enforcement of civil rights, e.g., Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 636
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1980), and
the elimination of discrimination in education, United States v. Hinds County School
Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 622 (5th Cir. 1977), and elimination of discrimination on the
basis of age, Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1131 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Adams, J., dissenting); see Bunch v. United States, 548 F.2d 336, 338-40 (9th Cir.
1977), sex, United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d 1088, 1090, 1094
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979), and physical handicap. Cf. C & P Tel.
Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 564 F.2d 503, 510, 512
1982] 1177
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the parties, becomes relevant only when a financial transaction de-
fines the rights of the parties."17 Thus, a change in law defeating
expectations of funding or reimbursement is typically suited to pro-
spective effect." The retroactivity inquiry focuses on the third fac-
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (purpose of amendment, to encourage hiring of the partially
disabled by reducing employers' exposure to liability, frustrated by prospective appli-
cation). Such "great national concerns" can also be implicated in actions between
private parties. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 718 (1974) (quoting United
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 69, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801)). In such a case a
court will balance the need to advance matters of "great national concern" against
the need to protect through prospectivity the rights and expectations of private
parties. E.g., Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 411 (4th Cir.
1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1122 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1980): id. ut
1131 (Adams, J., dissenting); cf. Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 636 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("A suit against a former FBI official for violation of
appellant's civil rights is not the sort of 'mere private case[] between individuals'
contemplated by the Court."). The import of "great national concerns" is not peci-
liar to "manifest injustice" analysis, see, e.g., NLRB v. St. Luke's Hosp. Center, 551
F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1976) (extension of National Labor Relations Act of 1935, §
2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), to nonprofit hospital employees implicates "national
policy"); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 680 (1st Cir. 1974) ("[M]inor
reallocations, not going to the heart of the bargain, are sometimes permitted to effect
an overriding public purpose."), or to changes occurring during the appellate pro-
cess. See Fairfax Nursing Center, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1297, 1299, 1302 (4th
Cir. 1979); Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080-82 (1st Cir.
1977).
117. E.g., Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1980)
(pension plan); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1980)
(same); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 826
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (funding of nonprofit organization); Coe v. Secretary of HEW, 502
F.2d 1337, 1340 (4th Cir. 1974) (medicare reimbursement). One criterion for assess-
ment of whether rights have matured is the extent of a party's reliance on precedents.
See Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1980); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1179-
80 (2d Cir. 1977). As for the reasonableness of the reliance, a court will examine the
signals given by judicial and administrative interpretations of the law prior to its
change. Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 411-13 (5th Cir. 1980).
One party's rights might vest under the old law if the other party fails to take timely
advantage of a subsequent change in law. E.g., Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 571
F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (party waiting for results of arbitration
before asserting rights under new regulation voiding pertinent arbitration clauses);
Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n v. Grace Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491, 496 (2d
Cir. 1976) (dilatory prosecution by party standing to gain by retroactivity may argue
for prospective application of change in law).
118. National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 826
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Coe v. Secretary of HEW, 502 F.2d 1337, 1340 (4th Cir, 1974).
Previous judgments and interim orders in the same litigation do not create protect-
able expectations, according to courts that have applied "manifest injustice" analysis.
See Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 622-23
(5th Cir. 1977); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1947) (no vested
right in prior administrative order); United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592
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tor, the impact of the change in law on the rights of the parties, when
the change in law imposes a new obligation. ' 9 Because a party must
model his behavior on what is defined as proper conduct when he
acts, a new obligation that redefines proper conduct may only be
applied prospectively.120 When the new obligation does not redefine
proper conduct, retroactive effect is fitting because the parties need
not have realigned their conduct to accommodate it.' 2 ' For example,
retroactive application of a new obligation that the defendant pay
attorney's fees was held proper in Bradley because the obligation
"would [not] have caused the [defendant] to order its conduct so as to
render this litigation unnecessary and thereby preclude the incurring
of such Costs." 2 2
F.2d 1088, 1094 & n.3 (9th Cir.) (no vested right to be sued in a particular manner),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). But see Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 647 F.2d 796, 806 (8th Cir. 1981) (right to ship coal at rate agreed in ICC
proceeding matured at time of decision), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982);
National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 826-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (NCIC right to funding by the OEO attached and was not lost retroac-
tively as of date of congressional amendment).
119. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 720-21 (1974).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 720. If, however, the litigation is at an advanced stage at the time
of the change in law and retroactive application of the change would require the re-
litigation of already litigated issues, then prospective application of the change is
recommended. See Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796,
806 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982); Ames v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 99, 108 (1971) (noting effect of change in law, though
not occurring during appellate process, on advanced stage of litigation); Lawrence v.
Staats, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 1981)
(per curiam) (prospective effect given to prevent return to "square one"). But cf.
Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Axelrod, 82 A.D.2d 83, 86, 442 N.Y.S.2d 338, 340
(1981) (no injustice in requiring party "to appeal administratively in a case ...
pending for five years"). Consideration of the stage to which an adjudication has
advanced is not new to retroactivity analysis. See Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,
Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 270, 130 N.E. 288, 290 (1921) (Cardozo, J.).
122. 416 U.S. at 721; accord Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1980);
King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1025 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978); Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1139, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 965 (1977); cf. Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077,
1081 (1st Cir. 1977) (similar test used when change not occurring during appellate
review); Overseas African Constr. Corp. v. McMullen, 500 F.2d 1291, 1297-98 (2d
Cir. 1974) (obligation reasonably expectable; no "manifest injustice" analysis used).
Other methods, less elaborate but no less reliable than the "manifest injustice"
analysis, have been developed to resolve the retroactivity question. A court may
simply remand a case for further proceedings in light of the change in law, assuming
without deciding its retroactive effect. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,
272-73 (1969); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1940); Cazad
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 622 F.2d 72, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1980); Grow v. Smith, 511
F.2d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1975); cf. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
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The advantage of "manifest injustice" analysis over Erie analysis
lies in the nature of their respective factual determinations. Under
Power Generation & Transmission Co., 646 F.2d 779, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (inter-
vening change in circumstances makes remand the appropriate appellate response).
Changes in law that are naturally suited to retroactivity include changes in remedies
or procedure. See, e.g., Sampeyreac v. United States, 32 U.S. 140, 151, 7 Pet. 222,
239 (1833); Overseas African Constr. Corp. v. McMullen, 500 F.2d 1291, 1297 (2d
Cir. 1974); cf. Bunch v. United States, 548 F.2d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1977) (amend-
ments to age discrimination statute do not create new rights but simply create new
procedures and remedies to enforce preexisting right to be free from discrimination
on basis of age). But see Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075, 1080-81
(D.C. Cir.) (retroactive application of change in procedure may be inappropriate at
late stage of litigation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976), cited with approval in
Lawrence v. Staats, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1227 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11,
1981) (per curiam). Other changes naturally suited to retroactivity include changes
expressly aimed at correcting a prior erroneous interpretation of a statute by the
reviewing court, see Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 642 F.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied.
440 U.S. 909 (1979), and changes that extinguish or confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981); Eikenberry
v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(per curiam); United States v. Elrod,
627 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1980). But see Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v.
Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1980) (Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.), not intended to confer jurisdiction in cases pending when enacted), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); McSparren v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876-77 (3d Cir.
1968) (rule abolishing "manufactured diversity jurisdiction" to have retroactive effect
only if statute of limitations has not run), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). For an
interesting treatment of these points, which is likely to be controverted, see Gager v.
White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 488-89, 425 N.E.2d 851, 856-57, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 468-69
(1981) (retroactive effect to be given Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), only
respecting those defendants who contested the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction asserted over
them under the discredited doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)). Changes in law naturally suited to prospectivity are
those which create new substantive rights. On this theory, courts have generally
given such effect to those provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976)), which extended coverage of Title VII to previously exempt entities. E.g.,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1976) (prospec-
tive effect to municipalities' coverage), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1975) (prospective effect to
abrogation of educational institutions' immunity). Contra, e.g., Brown v. General
Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974) (retroactive effect to federal
employees' coverage), aff'd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). See generally Hospital Employees
Labor Program v. Ridgeway Hosp., 570 F.2d 167, 170 (7th Cir. 1978) (substitution
of federal cause of action for state cause of action deemed an unforeseen obligation
warranting prospective application). Changes in statutes of limitations that would
leave a party with no legal means of redress invite prospective application. Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971); Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 616 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075, 1080 (D.C.
Cir.) (prospectivity saves litigation steps), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976). But see
Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 484, 487, 425 N.E.2d 851, 854, 856, 442 N.Y.S.2d
463, 466, 468 (1981) (problem of jurisdiction's constitutional infirmity outweighs
limitations problem).
STATE LAW CHANGES
Erie analysis, a federal court must first ascertain the applicable state
retroactivity analysis, if any exists. If it isolates such an analysis, the
federal court must view the facts of the case as would the state's
highest court using that analysis. Thus, Erie analysis requires the
resolution of a question of law, followed by the resolution, compli-
cated by a vicarious aspect, of questions of fact. In contrast, "manifest
injustice" analysis presents no problems of ascertainment or vicarious
resolution. The court can immediately proceed to the factual ques-
tions raised by its familiar "manifest injustice" analysis and resolve
them using its own, unborrowed judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Vandenbark Court's allegiance to Erie was understandable.
Erie's dramatic restoration of the integrity of state law in diversity
cases had made the Court circumspect in its treatment of state law.
But the Court failed to grasp that Erie's principle of uniformity
' does
not control the disposition of state law changes during diversity ap-
peals. Extending the principle of uniformity to an area in which it had
no place, the Court contributed to the irrepressible myth,'2' giving
Erie contours as undefined and oppressive in their lack of definition,
as those of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson that Erie discredited. By
importing "manifest injustice" analysis into the diversity context, a
court would strengthen the principle of uniformity by delimiting its
scope. It would also revive the struggle against retroactivity, advo-
cated by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Schooner Peggy
and carried on in current federal retroactivity analyses, but needlessly
abandoned by the Vandenbark Court. Although the analysis might
recommend the same retroactive effect to a change in state law that
would be dictated by the Vandenbark rule, at least the court would
have the latitude to give prospective effect to the change in law when
justice and good sense call for it. Moreover, the federal court litigant,
no less entitled to a deliberative analysis of the retroactivity issue than
his state court counterpart, would hear the sounds of the struggle
against retroactivity, not just the idle clipping of scissors and broad
strokes of the paste pot's brush.12 4
Michael J. Lonergan
123. The phrase was coined by Dean Ely. Ely, supra note 59, at 697-98.
124. Cf. Corbin, supra note 20, at 775 (court "must use its judicial brains, not a
pair of scissors and a paste pot").
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